The capability approach holds that the freedom to achieve well-being is of primary moral importance. Martha Nussbaum defends a list of ten central capabilities; Sen refuses a pre-determined one, in part to avoid paternalism. Their dispute is over how much a theory of justice may say about the good life.
What does the capability approach claim?
The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (SEP), first published on 14 April 2011 and revised on 17 April 2025, describes it as a theoretical framework with two normative claims. The first is that the freedom to achieve well-being is of primary moral importance.
That claim says what matters. It does not say which freedoms a society must secure, and on that question Nussbaum and Sen give opposite answers. One names them. The other declines to. Readers who want a related idea can start with our entry on human flourishing, which is related to this account but not the same.
What is on Nussbaum's list?
Nussbaum names ten central capabilities: life; bodily health; bodily integrity; senses, imagination and thought; emotions; practical reason; affiliation; other species; play; and control over one's environment. SEP cites her 2006 work, pages 76 to 78, for the list.
The list is meant to be modest. SEP reports that Nussbaum calls her theory a partial and minimal account of social justice, and that her focus on thresholds does not imply that reaching them is all that matters for social justice. The list marks a floor. SEP notes that her theory does not say what justice requires once the thresholds are met.
It is also meant to be revisable. In SEP's account she stresses that the list remains open-ended and always open for revision. The list is fixed in form and open in principle.
Why does Sen refuse a list?
SEP says Sen consistently and explicitly refuses to defend a pre-determined canonical list of capabilities, citing his 2005 work. The reason SEP gives is paternalism: he has been reluctant to specify a substantive list of capabilities and functionings in order to avoid it. SEP also ties the reluctance to avoiding the imposition of a particular conception of the good life.
The disagreement is therefore about method as much as content. Nussbaum answers the question of what a just society must secure. Sen declines to settle it in advance. Each choice has a price. A list gives critics a definite target; no list gives no one a floor to point to. The first risks being wrong in public, and the second risks saying nothing anyone can hold a government to.
Where does the list get its authority?
Nussbaum argues that her list can be derived from a Rawlsian overlapping consensus, SEP reports. Critics dispute that this derivation yields political liberalism. The Rawlsian idea is the subject of our entries on John Rawls's two principles of justice and on the veil of ignorance.
If the derivation fails, the list has to be defended item by item, each capability on its own merits. That is a heavier burden than appealing to an overlapping consensus.
Why is Nussbaum in the news?
According to University of Chicago News, the Library of Congress announced on 22 September 2026 that Nussbaum is the 2026 recipient of the John W. Kluge Prize. Daily Nous, writing on 24 September 2026, gives the prize as $500,000, awarded every other year. The university page states no amount, so that figure rests on Daily Nous alone.
Robert R. Newlen, the Acting Librarian of Congress, praised her spirit of intellectual openness and her willingness to engage with thinkers with vastly different opinions, as Daily Nous reported. Deborah L. Nelson, a dean at the university, said: Martha's work represents the very best of the arts and humanities.
UChicago also says Oxford University Press released her book The Republic of Love: Opera and Political Freedom in April 2026.
A prize is a verdict on a career, not on a list. Newlen's praise concerns her openness to opposing thinkers, which is a trait of the thinker.
What is the strongest objection?
The strongest objection is the one Sen's reluctance already points to. A list says what a good life contains, and a state acting on it may press that view on people who reject it. SEP, drawing on Argenton and Rossi, frames a related charge: that the approach rests on a substantively liberal understanding of what it means to be a reasonable and deliberative agent. That is the charge, as SEP reports it.
SEP records no direct reply from Nussbaum to this charge. She does describe her list as open-ended, which is a commitment, not a procedure: SEP's account in these passages does not say who revises the list or how. SEP also says some paternalism may be unavoidable or even desirable, citing her 2000 work at pages 51 to 56.
Our reading: that remark damages Sen's position more than hers. If some paternalism cannot be avoided, refusing a list does not remove the value judgement. It leaves the judgement implicit. A written list can at least be argued with. On SEP's account, Sen has been reluctant to specify a substantive list in order to avoid paternalism and the imposition of a particular conception of the good life. That is a serious worry about who gets to write the list, not a dodge. Sen's side keeps one real point, which is that a fixed list is the easiest target for the charge of imposition, and an assurance of openness asks critics to trust whoever does the revising.
We side with the list, on one condition: its revision process should be named. Open for revision is only as open as the person who decides.
Where to read next
- Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, capability approach: the source for the list, Sen's refusal and the objections above.
- Human flourishing (our glossary): a related idea, not the same account.
- What is Aristotelian eudaimonia? (related reading, not a source for any claim here).
- University of Chicago News and Daily Nous: the prize announcement and its details.